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The contrast transducer function (d 0 vs. contrast) for sine gratings was claimed to come up from some non-zero contrast value
rather than from the origin. This implies that there is a point (a hard threshold) on the grating contrast axis below which observers
could not distinguish between presentations containing gratings and those containing a homogeneous ﬁeld. We studied the ability to
order sub-threshold square wave gratings and found, to the contrary, that observers were able to do this no matter how low the
contrasts. At the same time, the observers failed to order the sub-threshold gratings when they were of the same contrast. The latter
is inconsistent with signal detection theory which predicts that an observer’s judgements are based on the same ordered set of
sensory states irrespective of whether the stimuli diﬀer or are the same. On the other hand, these data can be reconciled with the
notion of a threshold if the latter is thought of as a fuzzy rather than a sharp margin on the contrast axis.
 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
It is no exaggeration to say that the history of ex-
perimental psychology began with the concept of a
threshold (e.g. Boring, 1950; Woodworth & Schlosberg,
1955). However, few other ideas have been subjected to
such criticism, and even its very existence has been
questioned. Indeed, signal detection theory (SDT),
which refutes the idea of a threshold as such, has
dominated psychophysics for the past four decades.
SDT (Green & Swets, 1966) suggests that under a
threshold task observer responses to a stimulus (e.g.
‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’) are mediated by a sort of random vari-
able (sensory state) which may even, in the absence of
any stimulus, come into existence due to noise. An ob-
server rests a decision on the likelihood of that partic-
ular sensory state being induced by the stimulus plus
noise or by noise alone. According to the theory, an
index of detectability, d 0, is not zero for any stimulus
however small its intensity. In particular, a transducer
function, relating d 0 to stimulus intensity is generally
believed to be monotone, accelerating, and positive ev-* Corresponding author. Tel.: +44-2890-274542; fax: +44-2890-
664144.
E-mail address: a.logvinenko@qub.ac.uk (A.D. Logvinenko).
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doi:10.1016/j.visres.2003.09.015erywhere on the stimulus intensity continuum (see e.g.
Nachmias & Kocher, 1970; Nachmias & Sansbury,
1974).
However, the question of the existence of a threshold
still provokes debate. In particular, evidence has re-
cently appeared that d 0 can be zero for some non-zero
stimulus magnitude. Speciﬁcally, the transducer func-
tion for sine wave grating contrast was reported to ex-
hibit two distinct segments, the ﬁrst being a horizontal
interval coinciding with the contrast axis (Simpson,
Falkenberg, & Manahilov, 2003). This and previous
similar observations (Beard, Klein, & Tyler, 1995;
Kontsevich & Tyler, 1997, 1999) lead to the suggestion
that the observers in these experiments might have not
distinguished between gratings and a homogeneous ﬁeld
when the gratings’ contrast was below a certain low
value. If so, such a critical point on the contrast axis
may be interpreted as a sort of threshold (hard threshold
to distinguish it from a classical threshold which is de-
ﬁned as a grating contrast which yields the conventional
probability of correct responses), thus restoring life to
one of the oldest concepts in psychology.
It should be noted, however, that establishing a hard
threshold by ﬁnding a region on the contrast axis where
d 0 ¼ 0, is a very diﬃcult task from the statistical point
of view. As a matter of fact, there is no satisfactory
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of detectability d 0 derived from the empirical data ob-
tained in the standard two-alternative forced choice
procedure is equal to zero. Here we deal with the same
problem as that of diﬀerentiating two close probabilities.
In particular, an adequate solution implies a number of
presentations so large that it could not in principle be
implemented in a psychophysical experiment––an ob-
server’s sensitivity will unavoidably change due to visual
fatigue, habituation, ageing etc.
For this reason we decided to test the hypothesis of
the existence of a hard threshold by using a rather dif-
ferent approach with the following rationale. If there is a
hard threshold on the contrast axis then there should be
a zone below the hard threshold where d 0 ¼ 0. If so,
observers will not be able to order stimuli from this zone
relative to their certainty that what they observe results
from presentation of a pattern rather than a homoge-
neous ﬁeld.
We have attempted to ﬁnd such a zone in an experi-
ment designed as a direct test of the observer’s ability to
order low contrast square wave gratings whose contrast
may be presumed to fall within the hypothetical zone
where d 0 ¼ 0. Speciﬁcally, forced choice comparisons of
perceived contrast were made between gratings whose
detection probability for the observer had been shown
not to diﬀer signiﬁcantly from chance level (50%) in a
two alternative forced choice paradigm.2. Theory
An essential feature of any order is its transitivity
(e.g. Krantz, Luce, Suppes, & Tversky, 1971). An order
 on a set S is called transitive if for every triad of
stimuli s1; s2; s3 2 S, the following axiom holds true:
s1  s2 \ s2  s3 ) s1  s3: ð1Þ
This means that, presented with a triad of stimuli s1, s2,
s3, if an observer prefers s1 over s2, and s2 over s3, then
transitivity implies that the observer also prefers s1 over
s3.
An experimental test of transitivity of an order on
low contrast gratings (or any other stimuli around
threshold) is complicated by the fact that an observer’s
judgements are subject to random variability. In other
words, the same stimulus brings about diﬀerent com-
parative judgements for the same observer on diﬀerent
occasions. Therefore, we run into another problem,
namely, how to test transitivity under stochastic uncer-
tainty.
A traditional approach to this problem is to replace
the order (1) with one deﬁned in terms of probability of
preferences and then to test transitivity of this new,
stochastic, order (e.g. Falmagne, 1985; Suppes, Krantz,
Luce, & Tversky, 1989). There are several deﬁnitions
of such stochastic transitivity (e.g. Luce & Suppes, 1965,p. 340; Suppes et al., 1989, p. 389). For instance, one of
these (so-called strong stochastic transitivity) is
Pfs1  s3gP maxfPfs1  s2g;Pfs1  s3gg
for each triad s1; s2 and s3; ð2Þ
which says that the probability of an observer preferring
stimulus s1 over s3 is not less than either of the proba-
bilities of preferring stimulus s1 over s2, and s2 over s3.
However, such an approach is not relevant to our
purpose since we want to test the original deterministic
order (1) rather than a new one deﬁned by Eq. (2). In
other words, we want to test statistically a logical
statement (1) the same way as we usually test statistically
quantitative statements, that is, we want to ﬁnd out
whether or not the observers’ responses are in line with
the statement (1).
To test the logical hypothesis (1) one has to present
an observer with various triads of stimuli (of the set S)
fðs1; s2Þ; ðs2; s3Þ; ðs1; s3Þg and to record the observer’s
responses to these stimuli. Let us write R1ðs1; s2Þ if the
observer prefers the ﬁrst stimulus, s1, to the second one,
s2; and R2ðs1; s2Þ otherwise, that is, when the stimulus s2
is preferred to s1. There are exactly eight possible triplets
of responses associated with a stimulus triad fðs1; s2Þ;
ðs2; s3Þ; ðs1; s3Þg:
fR1ðs1; s2Þ;R1ðs2; s3Þ;R1ðs1; s3Þg;
fR1ðs1; s2Þ;R1ðs2; s3Þ;R2ðs1; s3Þg;
fR1ðs1; s2Þ;R2ðs2; s3Þ;R1ðs1; s3Þg;
fR1ðs1; s2Þ;R2ðs2; s3Þ;R2ðs1; s3Þg;
fR2ðs1; s2Þ;R1ðs2; s3Þ;R1ðs1; s3Þg;
fR2ðs1; s2Þ;R1ðs2; s3Þ;R2ðs1; s3Þg;
fR2ðs1; s2Þ;R2ðs2; s3Þ;R1ðs1; s3Þg;
fR2ðs1; s2Þ;R2ðs2; s3Þ;R2ðs1; s3Þg:
ð3Þ
Only one of the eight outcomes, namely, fR1ðs1; s2Þ;
R1ðs2; s3Þ;R2ðs1; s3Þg is not consistent with the transitivity
hypothesis (1). From deterministic point of view, once at
least one such a triplet is observed in the experiment the
transitivity hypothesis (1) should be rejected. However,
from stochastic point of view, for the transitivity hy-
pothesis (1) to be rejected one has to compare the
number of times when the outcome fR1ðs1; s2Þ;R1ðs2; s3Þ;
R2ðs1; s3Þg was observed with that for other outcomes in
order to decide whether the responses which contradict
transitivity can be accounted for by random ﬂuctua-
tions.
A statistical test of transitivity employed in the pre-
sent study, rests upon the following fact established re-
cently (Logvinenko & Vityaev, 2003). Given the
transitivity hypothesis (1), the occurrence of any of the
two antecedents in (1) increases the conditional proba-
bility of occurrence of the inference. To be more exact, it
is proved that the logical hypothesis of transitivity (1)
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strict inequality for conditional probabilities holds:
Pfðs1  s3Þjðs1  s2Þ \ ðs2  s3Þg
> maxfPfðs1  s3Þjðs1  s2Þg;Pfðs1  s3Þjðs2  s3Þgg:
ð4Þ
Inequality (4) can be reduced to the following two in-
equalities (Logvinenko & Vityaev, 2003):
PfABg > PfAgPfBg; ð5Þ
where A is the event which occurs if an observer prefers
s2 to s3 on condition that s1 was preferred to s2, and B is
the event which occurs if an observer prefers s1 to s3 on
the same condition; and
PfA0B0g > PfA0gPfB0g; ð50Þ
where A0 is the event which occurs if an observer prefers
s1 to s2, and B0 is the event which occurs if an observer
prefers s1 to s3, both on condition that s2 was preferred
to s3.
Hence, we observe that statistically testing transitivity
(1) can be reduced to testing statistical interdependence
between the antecedents and inference. The following
experiment has been undertaken to determine such in-
terdependence for sub-threshold grating contrast com-
parisons. The null (no transitivity) hypotheses to be
tested have that the inference judgement s1  s3 is
probabilistically independent from both antecedent
judgements s1  s2 and s2  s3. More speciﬁcally, the
following two null hypotheses:
H0 : PfABg ¼ PfAgPfBg; ð6Þ
H 00 : PfA0B0g ¼ PfA0gPfB0g; ð60Þ
have been tested against the alternatives (5) and (50). The
hypothesis of transitivity (1) has been accepted when
both the null hypotheses (6) and (60) are rejected in fa-
vour of the alternatives (5) and (50) respectively.3. Experiment
3.1. Method
Three diﬀerent experiments were carried out with the
same two male observers. Both observers were experi-
enced in psychophysical observations. One (BB––one of
the authors) was partially aware of the purpose of the
experiment and the other (RM) was completely un-
aware.
The Preliminary experiment was designed to deter-
mine individual contrast thresholds for each observer
which thereafter were used to set the contrast of the
gratings for each observer in the subsequent experi-
ments. The Main experiment examined the observers’
ability to order diﬀerent low (sub-threshold) contrastgratings. As the task to compare the visibility of sub-
threshold gratings is rather hard (especially for naive
observers), the main experiment was conducted in two
steps. In the main experiment 1 gratings of a little below
threshold contrast were used. After the observers were
used to this task, the Main experiment 2 was run with
gratings well below threshold, at contrasts as low as
could reliably be displayed on the computer monitor
screen. The Control experiment was the same as the
Main, except that the gratings to be compared were of
equal contrast, and was designed to reveal any bias in
the observers’ responses when there were no diﬀerences
between stimuli.
3.1.1. Preliminary experiment
In the preliminary experiment psychometric func-
tions (probability of correct response vs. contrast) for
a square wave grating were obtained using the two-
alternative spatial forced choice technique for both
observers. Gratings were displayed on an 8-bit Sili-
con Graphics monitor, which had a resolution of
1152 · 1080 pixels, using standard X-Window library
routines. The monitor was gamma corrected using
standard IRIX gamma correction tool ‘‘gamma’’. The 8-
bit display allowed the use of 256 shades of grey. Spatial
frequency of the grating was 33 c/deg. Nine gratings of
Michelson contrast from 3% to 13% were used to eval-
uate the psychometric function for the observer BB and
eight, from 2% to 14%, for RM.
On every trial, the observers were presented with a set
of three pairs of continuously visible circular windows,
each 43 min arc in diameter (from a distance of 4.36 m)
on a grey background, arranged in a rectangle (Fig.
1(a)). The space-average luminance of the windows was
greater (66 cd/m2) and the colour slightly bluer (CIE
chromaticity coordinates x ¼ 0:278, and y ¼ 0:313) than
that of the background (x ¼ 0:266, y ¼ 0:307, and lu-
minance 45 cd/m2).
In each trial observers were required to indicate the
window of each pair in which the grating appeared by
pressing the appropriate button of a mouse. The order
in which the observers had to make their responses on
each individual trial was random and indicated by an
arrow appearing on the screen (Fig. 1(a)).
All the gratings in all three pairs were presented si-
multaneously and remained present until the last (third)
response in the current trial was made. After the third
response was registered all the windows reverted to
blank ﬁelds until the next trial. There were no time
constraints on responses and observers could cancel a
response which they felt was mistaken. Observers laun-
ched each presentation themselves with a key press when
they were ready.
There were 50 trials in each daily test session. The test
contrasts for each trial were chosen randomly with the
constraint that all the three gratings presented at a trial
Fig. 1. Stimulus conﬁgurations for the preliminary (a) and main (b)
experiments (see explanation in text).
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alternative spatial forced choice decisions each day. One
experimental session lasted approximately 15–20 min.
Experimental conditions were kept as constant as pos-
sible throughout this period. Each test session was
conducted at the same time of day in the same semi-
darkened laboratory room with the same equipment.
Viewing was binocular.3.1.2. Main experiment
In the main experiment the observers were presented
with pairs of sub-threshold gratings and they were asked
to estimate which of the gratings in each pair was more
visible, that is, to prefer one of the two on the basis of
their visibility. Observers were instructed to base their
judgements on sensory factors alone, such as apparent
contrast or other apparent spatial structure or inhomo-
geneity. They were told to evaluate neither their conﬁ-
dence that the grating was presented in this particular
window nor anything like subjective or a posteriori
probabilities. They were also instructed not to feel ob-liged by logic to chose s1  s3 if they had chosen s1  s2
and s2  s3. When both gratings were completely invisi-
ble and observers felt completely uncertain they were
allowed to guess which grating was closer to threshold.
Four square wave gratings of the same 33 c/deg
spatial frequency were employed in both parts of the
main experiment, so that in all there were six possible
pairs of gratings to compare. Gratings were presented
on the same computer screen and under the same con-
ditions as in the preliminary experiment. The luminance
and colour of the windows, the grey background and the
average luminance of the gratings was the same as that
in the preliminary experiment. The gratings were pre-
sented in four circular windows (43 min. diam) arranged
in a rhombus (Fig. 1(b)). The window in which each
grating would appear was varied randomly from trial to
trial. In each trial all four gratings appeared simulta-
neously and remained present until all six judgements
were completed at which point the four windows re-
verted to blank ﬁelds until the observer launched the
next presentation. Each of the six possible pairs of
gratings was singled out in random order by a pointing
arrow appearing on the grey background which pointed
out the next pair to compare as soon as the response was
made (Fig. 1(b)). The observers were required to indi-
cate their preferences (as to which of two gratings was
‘‘more visible’’) by pressing a mouse button.
In the ﬁrst part, main experiment 1, contrast of
gratings was selected so as to make the task of com-
parison comfortable for each observer. For the naive
observer RM the contrasts were 4.5%, 8.5%, 11%, and
12.5% which corresponds to the 50–81% correct re-
sponse probability band on the psychometric function.
The contrast range for the observer BB was narrower
(3%, 6%, 7.5% and 8%) and farther from the threshold
point, namely, 50–58%.
In the main experiment 2 grating contrast was chosen
from the region of the psychometric function where the
probability of detection was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from 50%, or chance level. For both observers, these
contrasts were 1%, 2%, 3% and 4%, which was still re-
liably above the contrast resolution of the display
(0.5%). Although these gratings were never actually
visible to the observers (contrary to main experiment 1
where gratings were occasionally, though barely, expe-
rienced as visible), they accepted the task of comparing
such low contrast gratings as an extension of that re-
quired in the ﬁrst experiment.
Fifty trials were carried out in each daily test session
so that observers made 300 forced choice decisions each
day. One experimental session lasted approximately 20–
25 min.
3.1.3. Control experiment
To ensure that observers followed the instructions to
take into account only sensory factors, a control ex-
Table 1
Detection performance for observer BB
Contrast
(%)
Total number of
presentations
Number of
correct responses
Proportion of
correct responses
3 343 171 0.4985
4 338 150 0.4438
5 346 187 0.5405
6 348 177 0.5086
7 338 171 0.5059
8 330 190 0.5758
9 351 206 0.5869
10 383 231 0.6031
13 223 189 0.8475
Table 2
Detection performance for observer RM
Contrast
(%)
Total number of
presentations
Number of
correct responses
Proportion of
correct responses
2 187 88 0.4706
4.5 364 178 0.4890
6.5 183 92 0.5027
8.5 315 171 0.5429
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that of the main experiment except that three of the four
gratings (chosen at random for each stimulus set) con-
tained the same contrast. The contrast of the three
identical gratings was selected randomly from the four
available contrasts.
The control experiment was run simultaneously with
the main experiment 1, i.e. ‘‘catch’’ presentations for the
control experiment were interleaved randomly with
presentations designed for the main experiment. Ob-
servers were not informed that sometimes three of the
gratings had the same contrast, that is, they were not
actually aware of the control experiment.
Preliminary tests showed that if all four windows
contained identical gratings observers became aware
that sometimes all the gratings were the same. The in-
clusion of a single diﬀerent grating rendered the control
presentations indistinguishable from the main experi-
ment presentations. At least, observers did not report
that they noticed any diﬀerence between the main ex-
periment 1 containing ‘‘catch’’ presentations and the
main experiment 2 where there were no control pre-
sentations. The probability of control presentations was
set at 20% and data comparisons including the fourth
(diﬀerent) grating were not of course included in the
transitivity analysis of the control data.
The rationale of the control experiment was that
should the observers be inﬂuenced by a non-sensory
(logical) response strategy or factors such as window
position, then such a tendency would also appear in the
control experiment data.
3.1.4. Learning and training
As would be expected, it was found that the observ-
ers’ ability to detect and discriminate the gratings im-
proved from session to session in the preliminary and
main experiments but not in the control one. For this
reason there was a training period during which the data
obtained in the paradigms of the preliminary and main
experiments were recorded but not included in the ﬁnal
analysis presented below. 1 The training period was
continuing until the observers’ performance stopped
improving. The formal criteria to decide that the
learning was over was as follows. During the learning
period matrices of pair comparisons obtained in two
successive sessions (50 trials each) were tested on ho-
mogeneity. We believed that it was safe to start the
preliminary experiment when at least three matrices of
pair comparison in succession were homogeneous.
After the main and control experiments were com-
pleted we measured the psychometric function again to
make sure that it was stable, that is, there was no im-1 However, the data from all the control presentations through the
whole experimental period including training were combined to give a
total of 255 presentations for BB and 143 for RM.provement in detection of the gratings. A test for homo-
geneity showed that the function was indeed stable for
both observers.4. Results
The individual data on detection collected in the
preliminary experiment amalgamated with the data ob-
tained after the main and control experiments are pre-
sented in Tables 1 and 2, and shown in Fig. 2.
Smooth lines are the approximations based on the
Weibull distribution:
P ðcÞ ¼ 1 0:5 exp
"
 c
c0
 b#
; ð7Þ
where the parameter b speciﬁes the slope of the psy-
chometric curve and the shift parameter c0 is taken as an
estimate of the threshold. Threshold contrast gives a
probability of success of Pðc0Þ ¼ 0:816. These para-
meters have been estimated by the maximum likelihood
method for each observer separately. The estimates are
as follows: for BB c0 ¼ 0:126 and b ¼ 5:3; for RM
c0 ¼ 0:125 and b ¼ 5:9. There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
either between individual thresholds or between the
slope parameters.
The binomial test shows that not only for all the
stimuli used in the main experiment 2 but also for two
stimuli in the main experiment 1 detection was also at
chance level (p > 0:05).10 179 109 0.6089
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Fig. 2. Individual psychometric functions measured in the preliminary
experiment. Continuous lines are Weibull approximations (see Eq. (6)
in text).
Table 3
Proportion of preferences for each observer for stimulus si over stim-
ulus sj where the contrast of si are given horizontally above the tables
and the contrast of sj are vertically along the side
RM 2% 3% 4% RM 8.5% 11% 12.5%
1% 0.50 0.51 0.52 4.5% 0.50 0.49 0.56
2% 0.45 0.50 8.5% 0.56 0.62
3% 0.51 11% 0.58
BB 2% 3% 4% BB 6% 7.5% 8%
1% 0.46 0.52 0.51 3% 0.56 0.61 0.67
2% 0.54 0.57 6% 0.56 0.59
3% 0.50 7.5% 0.59
The proportion denotes the number of times the preference was ex-
pressed for si over sj divided by the total number of times a choice was
made between them (333 choices for RM and 360 for BB). The asterisk
() denotes proportions signiﬁcantly greater than 0.50 (p < 0:05).
Table 4
A 2 · 2 table associated with the null hypotheses H0 (Eq. (6))
B B Totals
A n11 n12 n1
A n21 n22 n2
Totals n1 n2 n
Here n11, n12, n21, and n22 are the number of times when the events
AB¼ fR1ðs1; s2Þ;R1ðs2; s3Þ;R1ðs1; s3Þg, AB ¼ fR1ðs1; s2Þ;R2ðs2; s3Þ;R1ðs1;
s3Þg, AB ¼ fR1ðs1; s2Þ;R1ðs2; s3Þ; R2ðs1; s3Þg, and AB ¼ fR1ðs1; s2Þ;
R2ðs2; s3Þ; R2ðs1; s3Þg were observed in the experiment respectively. The
totals n1 ¼ n11 þ n12; n2 ¼ n21 þ n22; n1 ¼ n11 þ n21; n2 ¼ n12 þ n22;
n ¼ n1 þ n2.
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for each observer in both main experiments are given in
Table 3. These data are based on 360 trials for the ob-
server RM and 333 trials for BB in the main experiment
1 and on 300 trials for both observers in the main ex-
periment 2. No proportion of correct discriminations in
the main experiment 2 was signiﬁcantly greater than
chance level (50%) for RM, and only one pair was
successfully discriminated above chance level for BB. So
for the set of gratings used in the second experiment not
only contrast detection but also contrast discrimination
were no better than chance level.5. Statistical analysis of transitivity
Testing the null hypotheses (6) and (60) against the
alternatives (5) and (50) can be reduced to a classical
problem of testing independence in a 2 · 2 contingency
table (see e.g. Kendall & Stuart, 1979). Indeed, with
each of the two null hypotheses a corresponding 2 · 2
table can be associated. Particularly, Table 4 is associ-
ated with the hypotheses (6). An analogous 2 · 2 table
can also be produced for the null hypothesis (60).
Given that the number of trials in our experiment was
large enough, we used the large-sample normal test
(Kendall & Stuart, 1979, p. 582) to test independence in
such 2 · 2 tables. The data for both the main experi-
ments and for the control experiment were tested sepa-
rately for each observer. Both the null hypotheses, (6)
and (6’), were rejected for both observers in both the
main experiments but not in the control experiment
(corresponding p-values are presented in Table 5).
It should be noted, however, that if we redo such an
analysis for the main experiments the set of p-values in
Table 5 will, generally, change because the set of the
sample triads will be diﬀerent (as only one of the four
triads from each presentation is randomly picked up
during a particular run). In other words, if we repeat the
analysis of the main experiment data a few times we will
obtain a whole set of diﬀerent p-values for each null
Table 5
The signiﬁcance p-values for the null hypotheses H0 and H 00
Observer RM BB
Hypothesis H0 H 00 H0 H
0
0
Main expt 1 0.034 0.032 0.000 0.000
Main expt 2 0.002 0.001 0.031 0.004
Control expt 0.097 0.732 0.678 0.437
Fig. 3. The cumulative distribution function of responses from ob-
server BB for the main experiments and for modelling. The abscissa
gives the p-value (see text). The ordinate shows for every particular x
how many samples produced p-values not exceeding x.
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ever, be diﬀerent depending on whether the null hy-
pothesis or the alternative holds true. More speciﬁcally,
under the null hypothesis p-values are to be distributed
approximately uniformly 2 whereas under the alterna-
tive they will gravitate towards zero.
So it seemed quite natural to repeat the statistical
analysis as described above a few times for the main
experiments. In this case, ﬁrst, we could use all the in-
formation obtained (not only that contained in the three
sampled triads), and second, a more sophisticated sta-
tistical analysis (based on the type of distribution of p-
values) could be applied. Namely, we could base our
decision on the whole distribution of the p-values rather
than on their individual values. Particularly, a shift in
the distribution towards 0 would provide a basis for
rejecting the null hypotheses (6) and (60) in favour of the
alternatives (5) and (50).
As a matter of fact, we repeated the analysis 100
times for both the main experiments making a resam-
pling at every run. To be more exact, the resampling
procedure was as follows. For every presentation made
in the main experiment a sample triad, ðsi1 ; si2Þ, ðsi2 ; si3Þ
and ðsi1 ; si3Þ, where si1 , si2 , and si3 are three of the four
gratings used in the main experiment, was constructed
randomly. If in reality (i.e. during the experimental
presentation) the observer preferred the ﬁrst stimulus in
the pair, the response R1 was assigned to this pair;
otherwise the complementary response, R2, was as-
signed. Then p-values were evaluated for every resam-
pled triad for each observer.
A computational model was also constructed which
simulated an observer responding randomly, irrespec-
tive of the contrast of stimulus patterns. Using this
model we generated the same number of responses as in2 This can be easily proved when the statistic is a continuous
variable. More properly, if a distribution function F ðxÞ ¼ Pfn6 xg
for a random variable n is continuous, then a random variable F ðnÞ
is uniformly distributed over the interval [0; 1]. Indeed, given 06 z6 1
we have the following sequence of obvious equations: PfF ðnÞ6 zg ¼
Pfn6 F 1ðzÞg ¼ F ðF 1ðzÞÞ ¼ z. Therefore, the graph of the cumulative
distribution function for F ðnÞ is linear on the interval [0; 1]. To be
more exact, it is a diagonal of the unit square. If n is a discrete random
variable, then the graph of its cumulative distribution function has a
staircase form. The greater the number of points in the distribution,
the narrower the width of the staircase and hence the closer the
distribution to a straight line.the main experiment 1 (i.e. 333 for BB, and 360 for
RM). Then the same statistical analysis of transitivity as
for the main experiments was carried out. As expected,
the model produced an almost uniform distribution of
p-values which, when plotted, gives a nearly linear cu-
mulative distribution function (see squares in Figs. 3
and 4).Fig. 4. The cumulative distribution function of responses from ob-
server RM for the main experiments and for modelling (the designa-
tions as in Fig. 3).
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main experiments for both observers were very far from
uniform. For observer BB, for instance, all the p-values
from both the main experiments were mainly concen-
trated in close vicinity to zero, indicating an entire in-
consistency with the null hypothesis. More speciﬁcally,
99% of the p-values derived from the results of observer
BB in the ﬁrst main experiment and 71% in the second
did not exceed 0.01 (Fig. 3). The results for observer RM
were also distinctively diﬀerent from uniformity (Fig. 4)
although the inclination from the diagonal was not so
pronounced as for BB.6. Discussion
We have attacked a problem of threshold by using a
new methodological approach. More speciﬁcally, we
have tested a hypothesis that there is a region on the
contrast axis where the stimuli are not distinguishable
from the background. This theoretical hypothesis can be
operationalised in at least three ways: (i) the stimuli
from this region produce 50% correct responses in a
two-alternative forced choice detection experiment (a
classical operational conception of threshold); (ii) the
index of detectability d 0 for the stimuli in this region is
equal to zero (a hard threshold); (iii) the stimuli from
this region cannot be ordered on the dimension of visi-
bility. The ﬁrst two predictions (50% correct probability
and d 0 ¼ 0) are not easy to test experimentally for the
reasons mentioned in Section 1. This is why we have
made an alternative prediction from the concept of
threshold, namely, ordering of sub-threshold stimuli,
and have used an alternative (transitivity) test.
It was found that while the traditional test (i) did not
allow us to reject the threshold hypothesis, the new
transitivity test (iii) reliably testiﬁed against it. Such a
diﬀerence in results is by no means surprising, and,
probably, it can be accounted for by the diﬀerence in
power of the statistical tests we have employed in the
preliminary and main experiments. 3 Namely, we believe
that the failure of the grating stimuli to be statistically
diﬀerentiated from the blank background stimulus in the
preliminary experiment was due to insuﬃcient power of
the traditional test we used in the preliminary experi-3 Although it is not easy to compare the powers of the two tests, the
transitivity test seems to be more powerful one. Furthermore, it is
based on a new approach which diﬀers from the traditional one as
SDT does from the traditional measuring thresholds. Recall that
although we have conducted one experiment, when analysing the data
we have undertaken resampling. It allowed us to evaluate not only one
p-value, as is usually done, but the whole set. So the analysis was done
in terms of distributions of the p-values rather than of an individual p-
value. It is equivalent of having ROC curves instead of individual
probabilities.ment. In other words, we would not exclude that the
true detection probability in the preliminary experiment
for those stimuli which were employed in the main ex-
periment, was more than 0.5, but the power of the
classical test to diﬀerentiate between two close proba-
bilities which we used in the preliminary experiment was
not enough to reveal it.
It is an unavoidable shortcoming of the classical
threshold theories that they make predictions which are
hard to test with standard statistical procedures.
Sometimes it can even lead to a sort of paradox. For
instance, if we adopt the operational deﬁnition of
threshold based on a 50% correct criterion we would run
into the following problem. A set of low contrast grat-
ings which produced not more than 50% probability of
detection on a forced choice task in the preliminary
experiment nonetheless provided suﬃcient information
for the observer to order these stimuli on a visibility
dimension in the main experiment. 4 However, this
paradox disappears if the theoretical framework is
changed so that the threshold hypothesis within the new
framework becomes reliably testable from the statistical
point of view.
So we have derived another prediction from the
threshold theory, namely, that stimuli with contrast
lower than some critical value cannot be ordered. This
prediction was not conﬁrmed in our experiment. Con-
trary to this prediction it was found that gratings with
very low (i.e. sub-threshold) contrast could be ordered
relative to their visibility, the order satisfying the axiom
of transitivity. This ﬁnding contradicts the assumption
of a threshold on the contrast axis as a margin dividing a
stimulus continuum into two subregions, in which
stimuli are either visible or not. On the contrary we have
found that there is a whole transition zone where visi-
bility of the stimuli gradually changes from one extreme
(‘‘completely invisible’’) to another (‘‘clearly visible’’).
So we conclude that we have found no evidence in fa-
vour of the threshold hypothesis (at least within the
contrast range we have explored).
At the ﬁrst glance our results support SDT as an al-
ternative to the classical threshold concept. Indeed, it is
a general assumption in SDT that sensory states are
stochastically related to stimuli, and that they mediate
the decision making process in threshold tasks. So, if as4 A similar paradox was established by those who worked in the
area called ‘‘subliminal perception’’ (e.g. Dixon, 1971; Holender,
1986). They claimed that information from stimuli, which were below
threshold, could be used to recognise, discriminate or categorise them.
We do not suggest that the stimuli in our experiments were
‘‘subliminal’’ (i.e. sub-threshold) since we do not accept the notion
of threshold. In other words, we do not consider ‘‘subliminal
perception’’ data as paradoxical because they can be accounted for
within the context of some detection theories (see e.g. Macmillan, 1986;
Macmillan & Creelman, 1991). However, we do consider that these
data show to what logical puzzles the concept of threshold may lead.
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an order on sensory states will naturally induce a cor-
responding subjective order in the observers’ judge-
ments, as in our main experiments.
Nevertheless, SDT cannot account for why transi-
tivity is not satisﬁed in the control experiment judge-
ments. Indeed, SDT suggests that an observer bases his/
her judgements on the same ordered set of sensory states
in both cases when the stimuli are diﬀerent and when
there is no diﬀerence between the stimuli at all. There-
fore, the order on the sensory states should have induced
a corresponding order on the pair comparison judge-
ments in both (main and control) experiments. How-
ever, the induced order has not been revealed in the
control experiment. Hence, we would consider the ob-
server’s inability to order stimuli of the same contrast
(relative to their visibility) revealed in the control ex-
periment, as evidence against SDT.
One could argue that there are other lines of evidence
in psychophysics in favour of SDT, particularly the
many experimental results which were found to be in
line with SDT. However, note ﬁrstly that the evidence in
favour of SDT’s application to psychophysics actually
comes from indirect sources such as the second choice
and rating experiments (Green & Swets, 1966; Swets,
1961; Swets, Tanner, & Birdsall, 1961). Secondly, the
experimental data supposedly corroborating SDT are
also in line with some threshold theories (e.g. Krantz,
1969; Luce, 1963).
Furthermore, recall that psychophysics has resorted
to SDT because there is an indeterminacy caused by an
observer’s inability to divide stimuli into exactly two
classes (e.g. ‘‘visible’’ and ‘‘invisible’’). However, the
statistical decision theory (on which SDT is based on) is
by no means the only formal framework which enables
us to deal with such an indeterminacy. Perhaps even
more appropriate would be fuzzy sets theory which has5 Strangely enough, despite the fact that the application of SDT in
psychophysics is based upon this assumption, the ability to order
sensory states has never been put to a direct experimental test. At the
same time, some widely used psychophysical techniques are based on
this assumption. One example is the rating procedure, where an
observer is asked to assign a category to his/her conﬁdence that s/he
really did see or hear a stimulus (Green & Swets, 1966). That observers
could give a consistent category response in such a task has been
known for a long time. In particular, the psychophysical method of
‘‘single stimuli’’ was based on the observer’s capacity to conﬁdently
classify stimuli within a threshold zone under certain categories: for
example high, medium, and low (Woodworth & Schlosberg, 1955, p.
217). Other examples are the multi-alternative forced choice methods
to measure threshold (Green & Swets, 1966). Under these methods an
observer is urged to choose one of many presentations in which a
stimulus might be present, despite the fact that the observer cannot be
sure that s/he experienced a stimulus in any of them. In fact during
such experiments observers always respond correctly with a probability
signiﬁcantly higher than chance. That is usually explained by assuming
an observer’s ability to order the ‘‘invisible’’ (or ‘‘inaudible’’).been designed to describe in quantitative terms vague
notions and fuzzy categories (Zadeh, 1965). 6
Indeed, the main problem with a classical notion of
threshold is that it cannot be described by a single
number, as was the original intention. Our experiments
show that an observer cannot make an exact decision as
to whether a particular stimulus belongs to the class of
‘‘visible’’ (or ‘‘invisible’’) stimuli, not only because the
words of ordinary language used to specify these classes
are vague, but also because there is the whole variety of
grades of membership in the class of invisible (as well as
visible) stimuli. In terms of fuzzy sets theory it means
that a subset of ‘‘invisible’’ stimuli is fuzzy. Fuzzy set
theory suggests a measure from some scale for an ele-
ment to be in a class. This measure is called a mem-
bership function for a given class. That the order in
question satisﬁes the axiom of transitivity means that
the grade of membership in the class of ‘‘invisible’’
stimuli can be expressed in terms of the order scale.
Therefore, an order scaling technique (e.g. Krantz
et al., 1971) would be appropriate when measuring a
membership function for the class of ‘‘invisible’’ (sub-
threshold) stimuli. After the membership function is
measured we could approximate it by a step function if
we want to have a single (not fuzzy) number to cha-
racterise an observer’s at-threshold-performance. Al-
ternatively, we can use fuzzy numbers following the
rules of fuzzy arithmetic (e.g. Rodabaugh, 1983) to
represent the border between sub-threshold and super-
threshold subsets on the stimulus axis. We believe that
the latter would seem to be more relevant to our sub-
jective experience under a threshold task than classical
threshold theories and SDT.7. Conclusion
When measuring only probabilities of correct re-
sponses in the threshold task one loses some information
essential for understanding human at-threshold-perfor-
mance. Our data show that even when the probability of
correct responses is at chance level an observer can
distinguish various grades of visibility of stimuli. More
speciﬁcally, an observer’s judgements of visibility are
ordered, and they satisfy the transitivity axiom. The
latter means that if visibility of grating a was judged to
be better than visibility of grating b and the latter in turn
was judged as better than visibility of grating c, then6 It should be noted that it is not a novel idea to use the fuzzy
mathematics in psychology of perception. Particularly, there are a few
perceptual models involving the fuzzy logic (e.g. Crowther, Batchelder,
& Hu, 1995; Massaro, 1987; Oden, 1979; Oden & Massaro, 1978).
However, none of them has used that notion in a way which might be
applied to threshold.
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of c.
However, this was the case only when all the stimuli,
a, b, and c, were diﬀerent. When they were the same an
observer’s judgements were not transitive. This ﬁnding
contradicts the prediction from SDT.
An alternative account of the data obtained is pro-
posed in terms of fuzzy sets theory. Two complementary
subsets of stimuli––sub-threshold and superthreshold––
and therefore a threshold as a margin dividing them,
are fuzzy rather than sharp. This means that there are
many grades of belongingness to both the sub-threshold
and superthreshold subsets. Hence, an appropriate
representation for a threshold is a fuzzy rather than an
ordinary (classical) number. This may have strong im-
plications for measuring thresholds since techniques for
identiﬁcation of fuzzy numbers might be quite diﬀerent
from current measurement techniques.Acknowledgements
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